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abstract. Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person
dies better than an outcome where the one is saved and the many die?
According to the standard utilitarian justification, the former is better be-
cause it has a greater sum total of well-being. This justification involves
a controversial form of moral aggregation, because it is based on a com-
parison between aggregates of different people’s well-being. Still, an alter-
native justification—the Argument for Best Outcomes—does not involve
moral aggregation. I extend the Argument for Best Outcomes to show
that any utilitarian evaluation can be justified without moral aggregation.
Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better
than an outcome where the one is saved and the many die? Most of us
judge that the former is better. Butwhat justifies this evaluation? The stan-
dard utilitarian answer is that it would be better if the many were saved,
because the combined gain in well-being for the many if they were saved
would be greater than the gain in well-being for the one if he or she were
saved.1 This form of utilitarianism justifies evaluations by
The Total Principle Outcome𝑋 is at least as good as outcome 𝑌
if and only if the sum total of well-being is at least as great in𝑋 as
in 𝑌.
The justification by the Total Principle is an example of moral aggrega-
tion, which some people, such as John M. Taurek and T. M. Scanlon, find
problematic. Taurek, for example, complains that
* Forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
† I would be grateful for any thoughts or comments on this paper, which can be sent
to me at johan.eric.gustafsson@gmail.com.
1 Timmons (2013, 117) and Portmore (2020, 5–6) put forward utilitarian accounts of
rightness with this kind of total justification.
It is not my way of thinking of [the people who need help] as each
having a certain objective value, determined however it is we deter-
mine the objective value of things, and then tomake some estimate
of the combined value of the [many] as against the one.2
Scanlon is somewhat less clear, demanding that
the justification of a moral principle depends only on various indi-
viduals’ reasons for objecting to that principle and alternatives to
it.3
An aggregate or sum of several individuals’ reasons, however, still de-
pends on those individual reasons. Yet, since Scanlon takes his demand
to rule out justifications that appeal to a ‘sum of a certain sort of value’, he
seems to have in mind a requirement that is, more or less, equivalent to
Taurek’s requirement.4
These moral-aggregation critics object that moral justifications
should not be based on comparisons between aggregates of people’s
claims or well-being.5 Unfortunately, this objection, which we may
call the Objection from Moral Aggregation, is rarely put forward in a
precise manner. Still, a plausible explication is that the objection rejects
justifications that involve moral aggregation in the following sense:6
2 Taurek 1977, 307. See also Rawls 1967, 59–60.
3 Scanlon 1998, 229.
4 Scanlon 1998, 230.
5 In taking the problem ofmoral aggregation to be a problem about justification, I’m
following Taurek. He argues that the relative numbers of people involved or any notion
of the sum of different people’s losses or gains shouldn’t be part of the justification of
acts and duties (1977, 312), nor ‘a ground for a moral obligation’ (1977, 297–302), nor a
‘source or derivation’ of duties (1977, 310), nor ‘something in itself of significance in de-
termining our course of action’ (1977, 293), nor something ‘that has relevance for choice
and preference’ (2021, 321).
6 The aim here is to capture the form of moral aggregation which Taurek (1977,
307–310, 313) and Scanlon (1998, 229–230) find problematic in moral justifications. My
account is, I think, a better interpretation of what the moral-aggregation critics object
to thanHirose’s (2015, 24) extensional account. OnHirose’s account, no lexical principle
for evaluating outcomes would be aggregative. Consider, for example, a variant of utili-
tarianism, that uses the Leximax Equity Criterion (defined later) as a tiebreaker in case
two outcomes have the same sum total of well-being. According to this lexical variant
of utilitarianism, an outcome 𝑋 is at least as good as an outcome 𝑌 if and only if, and
because, either (i) 𝑋 has a greater sum total of well-being than 𝑌 or (ii) the outcomes
have equal sum totals of well-being and 𝑋 would be at least as good as 𝑌 according to
the Leximax Equity Criterion. This variant seems to involve a form of moral aggrega-
tion that’s objectionable on the same grounds as the standard utilitarian justification
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A justification of a moral evaluation involves moral aggregation if
and only if the justification is fundamentally based in part on a
comparison where at least one of the relata is an aggregate of the
claims or well-being of more than one individual.
Rejecting moral aggregation means accepting
The Individualist Restriction The only comparisons that a
justification of a moral evaluation may be fundamentally based on
are comparisons where no relatum is an aggregate of the claims or
well-being of more than one individual.
The Objection from Moral Aggregation is not that moral evaluations of
aggregates of claims are necessarily problematic. What is supposed to be
problematic is that comparisons of such aggregates are part of the justifi-
cations of moral evaluations. So the evaluation that it’s better to save the
many than to save the one needn’t be problematic. The target of the Ob-
jection from Moral Aggregation is the justification of this evaluation by
the Total Principle or by some other form of moral aggregation.7 In fact,
many moral-aggregation critics believe that there is an adequate justifica-
tion of its being better to save themany rather than to save the one.8 They
believe that, while the standard utilitarian justification involves moral ag-
gregation, there is an alternative justification that doesn’t—namely, the
Argument for Best Outcomes.9
In this paper, I will extend the Argument for Best Outcomes with a
further principle to show that any utilitarian evaluation can be justified
without relying on the Total Principle or any other form of moral aggre-
gation.
by the Total Principle, but it wouldn’t be aggregative on Hirose’s account; see Gustafs-
son 2017, 966–967. On the other hand, Fleurbaey and Tungodden’s (2010, 402) Minimal
Aggregation condition is satisfied by some plausibly non-aggregative theories such as
the Maximax Equity Criterion, which says that an outcome 𝑋 is at least as good as out-
come 𝑌 if and only if the maximum well-being of any individual is at least as high in𝑋
as in 𝑌.
7 Taurek (2021, 321–322), for example, admits that he has no compelling objection to
someonewho judges that it’s better to save themany rather than the one if this evaluation
is not based on (nor unmediated by) the alleged fact that the combined suffering of the
many would be greater than the suffering for the one.
8 Among others, Kamm (1993, 75–98) and Scanlon (1998, 229–241).
9 See Kamm 1993, 85, where it was called the Aggregation Argument. The new name
comes fromKamm2007, 32. For a structurally similar objection to indifference between
saving the one and saving the many (which does not rely one Anonymity), see Kavka
1979, 291–292.
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1. The Argument for Best Outcomes
The Argument for Best Outcomes relies on three principles.10 The first
is based on the idea that morality demands impartiality between people,
other things being equal:11
Anonymity If outcomes𝑋 and 𝑌 only differ in that the identities
of some people who exist in these outcomes have been permuted,
then𝑋 and 𝑌 are equally good.
This principle is sometimes called ‘Impartiality’.12 But the principle re-
quires more than mere impartiality between outcomes that are alike ex-
cept for a permutation of identities—it requires that the outcomes are
equally good. It wouldn’t be any less impartial if the outcomes were in-
comparable in value than if they were equally good. Because, just like
equality, incomparability is symmetric. It doesn’t favour any one of the
relata.
While Anonymity is compelling, it isn’t beyond dispute: Anonymity
rules out partiality, and partiality is part of common-sense morality
(specifically, the idea that you may give extra weight to your own well-
being and the well-being of your friends and family).13 For the purposes
of our current discussion, however, the key feature of Anonymity is
not that it’s self-evident or undeniable but that it’s free from moral
aggregation—that is, Anonymity does not involve any comparisons of
aggregates of people’s claims or well-being. This feature is still clearer for
the following weakened variant, which suffices for the argument:
Pairwise Anonymity If outcomes𝑋 and 𝑌 only differ in that the
identities of two people who exist in these outcomes have been
permuted, then𝑋 and 𝑌 are equally good.
10 Here, I follow Hirose’s (2001, 341) axiomatic presentation of the Argument for Best
Outcomes. An advantage of his presentation is that it makes clear that the Argument
for Best Outcomes isn’t open to Otsuka’s (2000, 291–292) objection that the argument,
implicitly, balances aggregates of claims.
11 Sen 1974, 391 and Blackorby et al. 2005, 49.
12 See, for instance, Hirose 2001, 341.
13 A strong argument against partiality is that it leads to outcomes that are worse for
all parties in some Prisoner’s Dilemma situations; see Parfit 1984, 95–98. For the original
Prisoner’s Dilemma case, see Tucker 1980, 101.
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Consider the following outcomes 𝐴 and 𝐵, which only differ in that the
identities of two people (𝑃1 and 𝑃2) have been permuted (a third person,𝑃3, is unaffected):𝑃1 𝑃2 𝑃3𝐴 4 0 0𝐵 0 4 0
Since 𝐴 and 𝐵 only differ in that the identities of 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 have been
permuted, Pairwise Anonymity entails that 𝐴 and 𝐵 are equally good. If
two outcomes only differ in that the identities of two people have been
permuted, then no further person is affected and any loss for one of the
two is perfectly matched by a gain for the other.14 In a choice between𝐴 and 𝐵, for instance, any loss for one of 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 is perfectly matched
by a gain for the other. So, by only making one-to-one comparisons be-
tween individuals, we have that there is an equivalence of gains and losses
between 𝐴 and 𝐵. Even though this justification balances gains against
losses, it only balances the gain for one individual against the loss for an-
other individual. Hence the justification avoids moral aggregation and it
conforms to the Individualist Restriction.15
14 To see that this needn’t be the case with Anonymity, consider the following out-
comes (Chapman 2010, 182):𝑃1 𝑃2 𝑃3𝐴′ 3 1 2𝐵′ 1 2 3
Outcome 𝐵′ is just like outcome 𝐴′ except that people’s identities have been permuted.
Accordingly, Anonymity entails that 𝐴′ and 𝐵′ are equally good. But 𝑃1 loses 2 units of
well-being if 𝐵′ is chosen over 𝐴′, while no one gains as much. So there’s no parity of
individual gains and losses between 𝐴′ and 𝐵′. Yet, since more than two people’s iden-
tities are permuted in the move from𝐴′ to 𝐵′, Pairwise Anonymity does not entail that
these outcomes are equally good. To derive that conclusion, we need to apply Pairwise
Anonymity twice (for example, permute 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 then permute 𝑃2 and 𝑃3) and then
apply Transitivity (defined later).
15 We may be able to justify Anonymity (and the logically weaker Pairwise
Anonymity) without balancing any gains and losses. An alternative justification is based
on the claim that personal identities have no moral significance: It’s only the list of well-
being levels that is of moral concern, not who has which level. On this justification, we
don’t need to compare any gains or losses to derive that 𝐴 and 𝐵 are equally good. We
only need to compare the well-being levels between individuals: 𝑃1, 𝑃2, and 𝑃3 in 𝐴
have the same well-being as 𝑃2, 𝑃1, and 𝑃3 in 𝐵 respectively. A disadvantage of this al-
ternative justification of Anonymity is that it may seem to violate the separateness of
persons; see Gauthier 1963, 126–127, Nagel 1970, 138, Rawls 1971, 24; 1999, 27, and Nozick
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The second principle is based on the idea that, if one outcome dom-
inates another outcome in terms of individual well-being, then it’s bet-
ter:16
The Strong Principle of Dominance If (i) the same people exist in
outcomes𝑋 and 𝑌, (ii) each of these people has at least as high
well-being in𝑋 as in 𝑌, and (iii) some person has higher
well-being in𝑋 than in 𝑌, then𝑋 is better than 𝑌.
Consider the following outcomes𝐵 and𝐶, where everyone is equally well
off in 𝐵 as in 𝐶 except 𝑃3 who is better off in 𝐶 than in 𝐵:𝑃1 𝑃2 𝑃3𝐵 0 4 0𝐶 0 4 4
By comparing each person’s well-being in 𝐵 with their well-being in 𝐶,
we can conclude that each person has at least as high well-being in 𝐶 as
in 𝐵 and that 𝑃3 has higher well-being in 𝐶 than in 𝐵. Based on these in-
trapersonal comparisons, the Strong Principle of Dominance entails that𝐶 is better than 𝐵. This justification does not involve moral aggregation,
because it doesn’t balance claims or well-being between different people.
The third principle is the following principle of the logic of value:17
1974, 32–33. The Objection from the Separateness of Persons is, roughly, the objection that
losses can only be legitimate if they are compensated whereas a loss for one person can-
not be compensated by any gains for other people. Yet it’s hard to know what to make of
this objection. Many of those who insist on the separateness of persons—for instance,
Rawls (1971, 83; 1999, 72) and Nagel (1970, 142; 1978, 22)—defend the Difference Prin-
ciple (see note 22). Yet the Difference Principle also entails (i) Anonymity and (ii) that
personal identities do not matter in the sense that it doesn’t matter who has which well-
being level. (See Brink 2020, 386–388.) Could the Objection from the Separateness of
Persons challenge Pairwise Anonymity? Consider the use of Pairwise Anonymity in, for
instance, the justification of 𝐴’s being equally as good as 𝐵. If 𝐴 is replaced by 𝐵, then𝑃1 suffers an uncompensated loss. But, if 𝐵 is replaced by 𝐴, then 𝑃2 suffers an equally
great uncompensated loss. So, in terms of uncompensated losses,𝐴 and 𝐵 seem equally
bad—and thus equally good. Hence the separability of persons does not challenge Pair-
wise Anonymity.
16 Broome 1987, 410; 1991, 165. The clause that the same people exist in outcomes 𝑋
and 𝑌 should be read as saying that the set of people who exist in 𝑋 is the same as the
set of people who exist in 𝑌.
17 Arrow 1951, 13, Sen 1970, 2; 2017, 47, and Quinn 1977, 77.
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Transitivity If outcome𝑋 is at least as good as outcome 𝑌 and 𝑌
is at least as good as outcome 𝑍, then𝑋 is at least as good as 𝑍.
From that𝐴 and 𝐵 are equally good and that 𝐶 is better than 𝐵, it follows
by Transitivity that𝐶 is better than𝐴. As long as the first two evaluations
have been justified withoutmoral aggregation, Transitivity provides a jus-
tification of 𝐶’s being better than 𝐴 which does not involve moral aggre-
gation, since it doesn’t need any further comparisons.
With these principles, we can state the Argument for Best Outcomes.
Suppose that getting 4 units of well-being in outcomes𝐴, 𝐵, and 𝐶 corre-
sponds to getting saved and that getting 0 units corresponds to not being
saved. In 𝐴, only 𝑃1 is saved. In 𝐵, only 𝑃2 is saved. And, in 𝐶, both 𝑃2
and 𝑃3 are saved but 𝑃1 is not. Hence we have the following outcomes:18𝑃1 𝑃2 𝑃3𝐴 4 0 0𝐵 0 4 0𝐶 0 4 4
We can then argue as follows:
The Argument for Best Outcomes
(1) 𝐴 and 𝐵 are equally good. Pairwise Anonymity
(2) 𝐶 is better than 𝐵. The Strong Principle of Dominance
(3) 𝐶 is better than 𝐴. (1), (2), Transitivity
The difference between𝐴 and𝐶 is that, if𝐴were chosen over𝐶, only one
person (𝑃1) would be saved but, if 𝐶 were chosen, two other people (𝑃2
and 𝑃3) would be saved. Since we have shown that 𝐶 is better than 𝐴, we
have an argument for its being better that a greater number of people are
saved, and this argument does not rely on moral aggregation.19
18 Here and in the rest of the paper, we assume that outcomes with all possible distri-
butions of well-being exist. See Broome 1991, 80–81.
19 While we have applied the Argument for Best Outcomes to a one-versus-two case,
the argument also works, changing what needs to be changed, for any 𝑛-versus-𝑚 case,
where𝑚 is greater than 𝑛. Just replace𝑃1 with the people in the 𝑛-sized group, replace𝑃2
with 𝑛 people out of the𝑚-sized group, and replace 𝑃3 with the remaining people in the𝑚-sized group. The only difference, in case there are two or more people in the 𝑛-group,
is that Pairwise Anonymity is no longer sufficient to justify (1). So, in that case, we need
to justify (1) either by Anonymity or by repeated application of Pairwise Anonymity and
Transitivity.
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It may be objected that the Argument for Best Outcomes relies on
moral aggregation in the move from (1) and (2) to (3). The evaluation
in (3) is justified by (1), (2), and Transitivity. So 𝐶’s being better than 𝐴
is justified in part by 𝐴’s being equally as good as 𝐵 and in part by 𝐶’s
being better than 𝐵. But 𝐴’s being equally as good as 𝐵 is a comparison
of the whole of outcome 𝐴 with the whole of outcome 𝐵. And 𝐶’s being
better than 𝐵 is a comparison of the whole of outcome 𝐶 with the whole
of outcome 𝐵. Each of these compared outcomes includes the well-being
of three people. Hence the justification of the evaluation in (3) is based
in part on comparisons where at least one of the relata is an aggregate of
(among other things) the well-being of more than one individual.
Even so, this does not show that the Argument for Best Outcomes
involves moral aggregation, because these comparisons that the justifi-
cation of (3) is based on—that is, (1) and (2)—can in turn be justified
without moral aggregation. So the justification of (3) by (1), (2), and Tran-
sitivity is not fundamentally based on a comparison where at least one of
the relata is an aggregate of the well-being of more than one individual.20
2. The Extended Argument for Best Outcomes
The Argument for Best Outcomes can support the utilitarian evaluation
that saving the greater number is better if the competing claims have
equal strength. Still, the three principles that this argument relies on are
too weak to allow us to derive all utilitarian evaluations. For instance,
these principles are too weak to show that saving the many is better than
saving the one if the benefit for the one is greater than the benefit for each
of the many. Consider an outcome𝐷 where 𝑃2 and 𝑃3 are saved but their
well-being is slightly lower than 𝑃1’s well-being in outcome 𝐴:
20 Timmermann (2004, 109n3) objects that, while neither Pairwise Anonymity nor
the Strong Principle of Dominance involves moral aggregation, their conjunction does
so. Note, however, that the Argument for Best Outcomes does not rely on this con-
junction in the justification of any moral evaluation. Claim (1) is justified by Pairwise
Anonymity alone, and claim (2) is justified by the Strong Principle of Dominance alone.
The conjunction of (1) and (2), which we derive from the conjuncts by propositional
logic, is not a further moral evaluation in need of any further moral justification. Hence
the conjunction of (1) and (2) isn’t justified by the conjunction of Pairwise Anonymity
and the Strong Principle of Dominance.
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𝑃1 𝑃2 𝑃3𝐴 4 0 0𝐷 0 3 3
To see that no valid argument based on just Anonymity, the Strong Prin-
ciple of Dominance, and Transitivity could show that 𝐷 is better than 𝐴,
consider the Leximax Equity Criterion—a variant of the Leximin Equity
Criterion which prioritizes the better off rather than the worse off.
The Leximax Equity Criterion evaluates outcomes with the same pop-
ulation as follows: If the best off in a first outcome are better off than the
best off in a second outcome, then the first outcome is better than the sec-
ond outcome. If the best off in the outcomes are equally well-off, remove
one of the best off in each outcome and repeat the test until one outcome
emerges as better than the other or there is no one left in the outcomes. If
there is no one left in the outcomes, then the outcomes are equally good.
The Leximax Equity Criterion satisfies Anonymity, the Strong Prin-
ciple of Dominance, and Transitivity, but it entails that 𝐴 is better than𝐷 (and thus that 𝐷 is not better than 𝐴), because the best-off person in𝐴 is better off than each of the best-off people in 𝐷.21 Therefore, since
utilitarianism entails that 𝐷 is better than 𝐴, there is at least one utilitar-
ian evaluation that cannot be derived with just Anonymity, the Strong
Principle of Dominance, and Transitivity.
So, in order to justify the evaluation that𝐷 is better than 𝐴, we need
an additional principle. And, if we want to justify this evaluation without
moral aggregation, the additional principle cannot rely on moral aggre-
gation. Even so, there is a principle that fits the bill. Consider
Supervenience on Individual Stakes If the same people exist in
outcomes𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑈, and 𝑉 and, for each person 𝑃 who exists in
these outcomes, 𝑃’s well-being in𝑋minus 𝑃’s well-being in 𝑌 is
equal to 𝑃’s well-being in 𝑈minus 𝑃’s well-being in 𝑉, then𝑋
and 𝑌 are equally good if and only if 𝑈 and 𝑉 are equally good.
This principle says that, if everyone stands to gain or lose the same
amount if 𝑋 were chosen over 𝑌 as they would if 𝑈 were chosen over 𝑉,
then the evaluation of these pairs should be the same, in the sense that,
if the outcomes in one pair are equally good, the outcomes in the other
pair should be so too. Note that the consequent of Supervenience on
21 d’Aspremont and Gevers 1977, 204.
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Individual Stakes is biconditional; it only lets us derive that 𝑋 and 𝑌 are
equally good conditional on that 𝑈 and 𝑉 are equally good (and vice
versa). If the evaluation that𝑈 and𝑉 are equally good is justified without
violating the Individualist Restriction, then Supervenience on Individual
Stakes can justify that 𝑋 and 𝑌 are equally good without violating the
Individualist Restriction, because, in addition to the evaluation of 𝑈
and 𝑉, Supervenience on Individual Stakes only relies on intrapersonal
comparisons of gains and losses between pairs of outcomes. Hence, if𝑈’s
being equally as good as 𝑉 can be justified without moral aggregation,
then𝑋’s being equally as good as 𝑌 can be justified by Supervenience on
Individual Stakes without relying on moral aggregation.
For an example illustrating the application of Supervenience on Indi-
vidual Stakes, consider the following pairs of outcomes:𝑃1 𝑃2 𝑃3𝐴 4 0 0𝐸 2 2 0 𝑃1 𝑃2 𝑃3𝐹 2 0 2𝐺 0 2 2
If outcome 𝐴 were chosen over outcome 𝐸, then 𝑃1 would be 2 units bet-
ter off, 𝑃2 would be 2 units worse off, and 𝑃3 would be neither better nor
worse off. And, if outcome 𝐹 were chosen over outcome 𝐺, we get the
same result: 𝑃1 would be 2 units better off, 𝑃2 would be 2 units worse off,
and 𝑃3 would be neither better nor worse off. Since, in this manner, each
individual stands to gain or lose the same amount if 𝐴 were chosen over𝐸 as they would if 𝐹 were chosen over 𝐺, Supervenience on Individual
Stakes entails that 𝐴 and 𝐸 are equally good if 𝐹 and 𝐺 are equally good.
Suppose that the evaluation that 𝐹 and 𝐺 are equally good is justified by
Pairwise Anonymity (a justification that doesn’t rely on moral aggrega-
tion). Then the evaluation that 𝐴 and 𝐸 are equally good can be justified
by Supervenience on Individual Stakes without relying on moral aggre-
gation.
The point here is not that Supervenience on Individual Stakes is self
evident or uncontroversial. The principle reflects utilitarianism’s insensi-
tivity to whether the distribution of well-being is equal, which is contro-
versial from the perspective of some egalitarian theories.22 While there’s
no difference with respect to inequality between 𝐹 and 𝐺, there is more
22 To see that Supervenience on Individual Stakes rules out the evaluative version of
Rawls’s (1971, 83; 1999, 72)Difference Principle, consider the following pairs of outcomes:
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inequality in 𝐴 than in 𝐸.23 For the purposes of our discussion, however,
the key feature of Supervenience on Individual Stakes is that it satisfies
the Individualist Restriction and hence that it doesn’t involve moral ag-
gregation.24
We have that each one of Pairwise Anonymity, the Strong Principle
of Dominance, Supervenience on Individual Stakes, and Transitivity sat-
isfies the Individualist Restriction. And, with these four principles, we
can derive that 𝐷 is better than 𝐴. Hence we can justify 𝐷’s being better
than 𝐴 without resorting to moral aggregation in any step. To see this,
consider the following outcomes:𝑃1 𝑃2𝐻 2 2𝐼 1 3 𝑃1 𝑃2𝐽 2 1𝐾 1 2
The evaluative version of the Difference Principle can be stated as follows:
The Evaluative Difference Principle Outcome𝑋 is at least as good as outcome𝑌 if and only if the minimal well-being of any person is at least as high as in𝑋
as in 𝑌.
According to the Evaluative Difference Principle, we have that outcome𝐻 is better than
outcome 𝐼 and that outcomes 𝐽 and𝐾 are equally good. But, if 𝐽 and𝐾 are equally good,
we have, from Supervenience on Individual Stakes, that𝐻 and 𝐼 are equally good.
23 Moving from 𝐴 to 𝐸 involves a transfer of well-being from a better-off person to
a worse-off person (and this transfer does not make the recipient better off than the
donor). So, by the Pigou-Dalton principle (Pigou 1912, 24 and Dalton 1920, 351), 𝐸 is
more equal than 𝐴.
24 For a further explanation why Supervenience on Individual Stakes doesn’t involve
moral aggregation, note that Supervenience on Individual Stakes is consistent with and
suggested by Parfit’s (n.d., ch. 6) principle ‘Minimax Loss: The best outcome is the one
in which the greatest loser loses least.’ We can generalize Parfit’s principle as follows
(following the model of the Minimax-Regret Rule in Savage 1951, 59 and Milnor 1954,
50):
The Minimax-Loss Principle Outcome𝑋 is at least as good as outcome 𝑌 if
and only if the greatest loss in well-being for any person if 𝑌 were chosen over𝑋 is at least as great as the greatest loss in well-being for any person if𝑋 were
chosen over 𝑌.
Given the Minimax-Loss Principle, it would be worse if single person suffers a major
loss than if a large number of people each suffers a small loss, other things being equal.
This view avoids moral aggregation, yet it entails Supervenience on Individual Stakes.
Therefore, Supervenience on Individual Stakes cannot involve moral aggregation.
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We then argue as follows:
The Extended Argument for Best Outcomes
(1) 𝐹 and 𝐺 are equally good. Pairwise Anonymity
(2) 𝐴 and 𝐸 are equally good. (1), Supervenience on Individual Stakes
(3) 𝐸 and 𝐺 are equally good. Pairwise Anonymity
(4) 𝐷 is better than 𝐺. The Strong Principle of Dominance
(5) 𝐷 is better than 𝐴. (2), (3), (4), Transitivity
Hence we have an argument that it can be better that two people each get
a smaller benefit than that one person gets a larger benefit. And, crucially,
this argument does not rely on moral aggregation.
3. A justification of utilitarianism without moral aggregation
The Extended Argument for Best Outcomes can be used to defend utili-
tarianism against theObjection fromMoral Aggregation. The argument’s
four principles jointly entail, as we shall see, the same evaluations as utili-
tarianism given a fixed population of two ormore people. In other words,
the four principles of the Extended Argument for Best Outcomes jointly
entail a value ranking of any pair of outcomes in which the same (two
or more) people exist, and this ranking will coincide with the utilitarian
value ranking of these outcomes. So, given that there are at least two peo-
ple, these principles entail a version of utilitarianism which is restricted
to evaluations with a fixed population, namely,
Fixed-Population Utilitarianism If the same people exist in
outcomes𝑋 and 𝑌, then𝑋 is at least as good as 𝑌 if and only if
the sum total of well-being is at least as great in𝑋 as in 𝑌.
Moreover, two of the principles in the Extended Argument for Best Out-
comes are stronger than necessary. We can weaken both Transitivity and
12
the Strong Principle of Dominance and still derive Fixed-PopulationUtil-
itarianism. Consider the following weakening of Transitivity:25
Fixed-Population Transitivity If (i) the same people exist in
outcomes𝑋, 𝑌, and 𝑍, (ii)𝑋 is at least as good as 𝑌, and (iii) 𝑌 is
at least as good as 𝑍, then𝑋 at least as good as 𝑍.
And consider the following weakening of the Strong Principle of Domi-
nance:26
The Weak Principle of Dominance If (i) some person exits in
outcomes𝑋 and 𝑌, (ii) the same people exist in𝑋 and 𝑌, and (iii)
each of these people has higher well-being in𝑋 than in 𝑌, then𝑋
is better than 𝑌.
These weakened principles along with Pairwise Anonymity and Superve-
nience on Individual Stakes jointly entail the same evaluations as Fixed-
PopulationUtilitarianism for finite populations of at least two people.We
can prove the following theorem:27
25 By weakening Transitivity to fixed-population cases, we avoid some controversial
variable-population cases. For example, themere-addition paradox (seeMcMahan 1981,
122–123 andParfit 1982, 158–160) have lured somepeople, such asTemkin (1987), to reject
Transitivity.
26 You may wonder why clause (i) is needed. Note that, without this clause, the Weak
Principle of Dominance wouldn’t be consistent with the existence of unpopulated out-
comes. Suppose that no people exist in 𝑋 and 𝑌. Then clause (ii) holds—see note 16.
And, given the convention that universal quantifications over empty domains are vacu-
ously true, clause (iii) holds too (see Gustafsson 2020, 129n40). So we would have that𝑋
is better than 𝑌 and that 𝑌 is better than𝑋, which violates the asymmetry of betterness
(see Halldén 1957, 25 and Chisholm and Sosa 1966, 247).
27 See appendix A for proof. For some closely related theorems, see Milnor 1954, 53,
d’Aspremont and Gevers 1977, 203, and Blackorby et al. 2002, 569. Note that these ear-
lier theorems, unlike the one presented in this paper, all assume Completeness, which
is controversial. (Completeness is the principle that outcome𝑋 is at least as good as out-
come𝑌 or𝑌 is at least as good as𝑋. See Chang 1997 for an overview of the chief worries
about Completeness.) Hence the new theorem has an advantage over these earlier theo-
rems. But, for the main argument in this paper, this difference between these theorems
doesn’tmattermuch, because Completeness doesn’t involvemoral aggregation. Another
difference is that my proof relies on Pairwise Anonymity rather than Anonymity. While
this difference is mathematically trivial, it helps my argument that utilitarianism doesn’t
rely onmoral aggregation, since—as we saw in note 14—it is more obvious that Pairwise
Anonymity avoids moral aggregation than that Anonymity does so. Moreover, Pairwise
Anonymity has the same advantage over Denicolò’s (1999, 276–277) strengthened vari-
ant of Anonymity that allows him to drop Transitivity in his characterization of utilitar-
ianism.
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Given that the total number of people is finite and greater than
one, Fixed-Population Utilitarianism is true if and only if the
following principles are all true
• Fixed-Population Transitivity,
• Pairwise Anonymity,
• Supervenience on Individual Stakes, and
• The Weak Principle of Dominance.
From this theorem,we have that each one of Fixed-PopulationUtilitarian-
ism’s evaluations of outcomes with at least two people can be justified by
Fixed-PopulationTransitivity, PairwiseAnonymity, Supervenience on In-
dividual Stakes, and the Weak Principle of Dominance. And, since none
of these principles involves moral aggregation, this justification of Fixed-
PopulationUtilitarianismdoes not violate the Individualist Restriction.28
So utilitarianism can sidestep the Objection from Moral Aggregation.29
(To also derive the same evaluations as utilitarianism for fixed popu-
lations with fewer than two people, we also need the following principle
28 If we replace well-being with expected well-being in the Weak Principle of Domi-
nance and in Supervenience on Individual Stakes, we can justify the following subjective
version of utilitarianism in the same manner without moral aggregation:
Subjective Fixed-Population Utilitarianism If the same people exist in
outcomes𝑋 and 𝑌, then𝑋 is at least as good as 𝑌 if and only if the sum total of
expected well-being is at least as great in𝑋 as in 𝑌.
29 Note that not just any characterization of utilitarianismwill do for this purpose, be-
cause many such characterizations include a principle that seems to involve some form
of moral aggregation. Still, the proofs in Maskin 1978, 94 and Blackorby et al. 2005, 118
should also work (but with the slight drawback of some more complicated conditions).
Harsanyi’s (1955, 313–314) social-aggregation theorem could also work, but it requires
that we assume the axioms of ExpectedUtility Theory for the (personal and impersonal)
value orderings of risky prospects. These axioms don’t allow for objective versions of util-
itarianism (seeGustafsson 2019, 194–195 for a collection of sources) which take the value
of a prospect to be equal to the value of the outcome that would be the final outcome
of the prospect. This violates two axioms of Expected Utility Theory, namely, Indepen-
dence (Jensen 1967, 173) and Continuity (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, 26–27
and Blackwell and Girshick 1954, 106). Moreover, Harsanyi’s proof requires that we as-
sume Completeness (see note 27) for both personal and impersonal value orderings.
This, as Broome (1987, 418; 2015, 258–259) points out, is a significant drawback. Notably,
the characterization in this paper does not require Completeness.
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of the logic of value:30
Reflexivity Outcome𝑋 is at least as good as𝑋.
Reflexivity does not involve moral aggregation. It just compares an out-
comewith itself. So there are no relevant claims of any individual.We can
prove the following corollary:31
Given that the total number of people is finite, Fixed-Population





• Supervenience on Individual Stakes, and
• The Weak Principle of Dominance.
But, since we only need Reflexivity to evaluate outcomes with fewer than
two people, this corollary won’t matter for our discussion of moral aggre-
gation. Moral aggregation requires at least two people.)
It may be objected that, if we were to justify utilitarian evaluations
with these non-aggregative principles, we would still end up with exten-
sionally the same evaluations as if we evaluated outcomes on the basis of
their sum total of well-being. So wewould still evaluate as if we evaluated
on the basis of moral aggregation. But, first, note that we would also eval-
uate as if we didn’t evaluate on the basis of moral aggregation, since we
30 Arrow 1951, 14, Chisholm and Sosa 1966, 248, and Sen 1970, 2; 2017, 47. If we al-
low outcomes without people, then Reflexivity conflicts withAverage Utilitarianism, the
view that an outcome 𝑋 is at least as good as an outcome 𝑌 if and only if the average
well-being is at least as high in 𝑋 as in 𝑌. (See, for example, Harsanyi 1955, 316.) Since
there is no well-defined average of well-being for outcomes without people, Average
Utilitarianism entails that an outcome without people is not at least as good as itself.
(The Evaluative Difference Principle—see note 22—and the Minimax-Loss Principle—
see note 24—yield much the same problem.) To get around this problem, we could re-
place Reflexivity with Populated Reflexivity, the principle that, if some person exists in
outcome 𝑋, then 𝑋 is at least as good as 𝑋. Given that we replace Reflexivity with Pop-
ulated Reflexivity and assume that the total number of people is not only finite but also
greater than zero, the corollary will still hold.
31 See appendix B for proof.
15
would also evaluate as if wemerely applied the above principles. And, sec-
ond, note that, however we evaluate outcomes, there will always be a way
of justifying an extensionally equivalent evaluation on the basis of some
(perhaps convoluted) form ofmoral aggregation.Hence, on the one hand,
if the Objection from Moral Aggregation is that we shouldn’t evaluate as
if we evaluated on the basis of moral aggregation, it seems to prove too
much, since it would rule out any way of evaluating outcomes. On the
other hand, if the objection is merely that moral aggregation shouldn’t
figure in the justification of evaluations, then it shouldn’t cause concern
about utilitarianism, since, by way of the above principles, the utilitarian
evaluations can be justified without moral aggregation.
Appendices
A. Proof of the theorem
We shall prove the theorem that, given that the total number of people
is finite and greater than one, Fixed-Population Utilitarianism is true if
and only if Fixed-Population Transitivity, Pairwise Anonymity, Superve-
nience on Individual Stakes, and the Weak Principle of Dominance are
all true.32
We begin with the right-to-left direction of the biconditional. Sup-
pose that 𝑋 and 𝑌 are outcomes with the same people 𝑃1,… , 𝑃𝑛. Con-
sider, first, the case where𝑋 and 𝑌 have the same sum total of well-being.
Starting with this pair of outcomes, we will consider a sequence of pairs
of outcomes where, in each pair, the outcomes are equally good if the out-
comes in the next pair are equally as good as each other, until we get to a
pair of outcomes that we can show are equally as good as each other.
(sort) If there are two or more people in the outcomes, perform
the following sorting procedure on each outcome in the pair: As long as
it is not the case, for each 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛 − 1, that 𝑃𝑖 has at least as high well-
being as 𝑃𝑖+1 in the outcome, find the smallest integer 𝑗 such that 𝑃𝑗+1 has
higher well-being than 𝑃𝑗 in the outcome; and replace the outcome with
an outcome that only differs in that the identities of𝑃𝑗 and𝑃𝑗+1 have been
permuted. It follows, from Pairwise Anonymity, that each new outcome
is equally as good as the outcome it replaces. And we have, from Fixed-
Population Transitivity, that the resulting, sorted outcome is equally as
32 The proof technique is essentially the same as inMilnor’s (1954, 53) characterization
of the Laplace criterion.
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good as the one we started with. Since there are only a finite number of
people in the outcomes, this procedure will provide, in a finite number of
iterations, a new pair of outcomes with people ordered (𝑃1,… , 𝑃𝑛) by de-
creasing well-being. And the outcomes in this new pair are equally good
if and only if the outcomes in the previous pair are equally good.
(decrease) Then, with a pair of outcomes with people ordered
by decreasing well-being, replace these outcomes by two new outcomes
that only differ from the old two respectively in that each person’s well-
being is decreased by whichever is lower of that person’s well-being levels
in the old pair of outcomes. We have, by Supervenience on Individual
Stakes, that the outcomes in the new pair are equally good if and only if
the outcomes in the old pair are equally good.
Repeat step sort followed by step decrease until, after a finite num-
ber of iterations of these steps, we have a pair of outcomes in which every-
one has zero well-being. To see that this is what we’ll end up with, note
that we started with two outcomes with an equal sum total of well-being
and, after sort or decrease, we still have two outcomes with an equal
sum total of well-being since sort leaves the sum totals of well-being un-
changed and decrease subtracts the same amount of well-being from
both outcomes. After the first iteration of decrease, any negative well-
being has been cancelled out. From then on, since the outcomes have the
same sum total of well-being, there are people with positive well-being
in one of the outcomes if and only if there are people with positive well-
being in the other outcome. Hence, after each further iteration of sort,
there must be at least one person (specifically, 𝑃1) that has positive well-
being in both outcomes. In the next iteration of decrease, this person
will then get their well-being decreased by the lowest of their well-being
levels in the two outcomes and thereby end up with zero well-being in
at least one of the outcomes. So, in each iteration of decrease after the
first one, we have that one of the outcomes will have at least one further
person with zero well-being. Moreover, since all negative well-being has
been cancelled out, decrease leaves all people with zero well-being as
they are. And sort leaves the number of people with zero well-being un-
changed. Hence, with each further iteration of decrease, we’ll get more
and more people with zero well-being in the outcomes. So, after a finite
number of iterations of sort and decrease, we end up with a pair of
outcomes𝑋′ and 𝑌′ where everyone has zero well-being.
Then, let 𝑋″ be an outcome that is just like 𝑋′ except that the iden-
tities of 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 have been permuted. By Pairwise Anonymity, we have
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that𝑋′ and𝑋″ are equally good. For each person in these outcomes, the
difference in their well-being between 𝑋′ and 𝑌′ is the same as the dif-
ference in their well-being between 𝑋′ and 𝑋″, namely, no difference at
all. So, by Supervenience on Individual Stakes, we have that 𝑋′ and 𝑌′
are equally good since𝑋′ and𝑋″ are equally good.
Since the outcomes in the final pair are equally good (that is,𝑋′ and𝑌′ are equally good), we have that, in each pair in the sequence of pairs we
have considered, the outcomes are equally good. Thus we can conclude
that the outcomes in the pair we started with are equally good—that is,𝑋 and 𝑌 are equally good. So we have that, if the sum total of well-being
is the same in𝑋 and 𝑌, then𝑋 and 𝑌 are equally good.
We now turn to the case where the sum total of well-being is greater
in one of the outcomes. So suppose now that the sum total of well-being
is greater in 𝑋 than in 𝑌. And, like before, suppose that the same people
exist in 𝑋 and 𝑌. Let 𝑋′ and 𝑌′ be two outcomes such that (i) the same
people exist in 𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑋′, and 𝑌′, (ii) 𝑋′ has the same sum total of well-
being as 𝑋, (iii) 𝑌′ has the same sum total of well-being as 𝑌, and (iv)
each of 𝑋′ and 𝑌′ is perfectly equal—that is, in each of these outcomes
everyone has the same level of well-being. Hence we have that the same
people exist in 𝑋′ and 𝑌′ and that each of these people has higher well-
being in𝑋′ than in𝑌′. Then, from theWeak Principle of Dominance, we
have that 𝑋′ is better than 𝑌′. Since 𝑋 and 𝑋′ have the same sum total
of well-being, we have, by our previous result, that 𝑋 and 𝑋′ are equally
good. And, since𝑌 and𝑌′ have the same sum total of well-being, we sim-
ilarly have that 𝑌 and 𝑌′ are equally good. Then, from Fixed-Population
Transitivity, we have that𝑋 is better than 𝑌.
So, combining these results, we have that 𝑋 is at least as good as 𝑌 if
and only if the sum total of well-being is at least as great in 𝑋 as in 𝑌.
Hence, if Fixed-Population Transitivity, Pairwise Anonymity, Superve-
nience on Individual Stakes, and the Weak Principle of Dominance are
all true, then Fixed-Population Utilitarianism is true given a finite pop-
ulation of at least two people. The second part of the proof—that is, the
proof of the biconditional’s left-to-right direction—is trivial.
B. Proof of the corollary
We shall prove the corollary that, given that the total number of peo-
ple is finite, Fixed-Population Utilitarianism is true if and only if Fixed-
Population Transitivity, Pairwise Anonymity, Reflexivity, Supervenience
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on Individual Stakes, and the Weak Principle of Dominance are all true.
We begin with the right-to-left direction of the biconditional. Given
the theorem we proved in appendix A, we only need to cover outcomes
with fewer than two people. First, we will consider the case where𝑋 and𝑌 have the same sum total of well-being.
Suppose that only one person exists in 𝑋 and 𝑌. We have, by Reflex-
ivity, that 𝑋 is equally as good as 𝑋. For the only person in 𝑋 and 𝑌, the
difference in their well-being between 𝑋 and 𝑌 is the same as the differ-
ence in their well-being between 𝑋 and 𝑋, namely, no difference at all.
So, by Supervenience on Individual Stakes, we have that 𝑋 is equally as
good as 𝑌 since𝑋 is equally as good as𝑋.
Next, suppose that no people exist in 𝑋 and 𝑌. We have, by Reflex-
ivity, that 𝑋 is equally as good as 𝑋. Since no people exist in 𝑋 and 𝑌,
we (trivially) have that the same people exist in these outcomes.33 Then,
by Supervenience on Individual Stakes, we have that𝑋 and 𝑌 are equally
good.
Finally, we turn to the casewhere the sum total of well-being is greater
in𝑋 than in𝑌. In this case, there has to be one personwho exists in𝑋 and𝑌 and who has higher well-being in 𝑋 than in 𝑌. So, since there is only
one person in 𝑋 and 𝑌 and this person has higher well-being in 𝑋 than
in 𝑌, we have, from the Weak Principle of Dominance, that 𝑋 is better
than 𝑌.
Hence, if Fixed-Population Transitivity, Pairwise Anonymity, Re-
flexivity, Supervenience on Individual Stakes, and the Weak Principle
of Dominance are all true, then Fixed-Population Utilitarianism is true
given a finite population. Like before, the proof of the biconditional’s
left-to-right direction is trivial.
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